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Economic development has evolved since the Great Depression era in the 
United States from a stance of pure “smokestack chasing” to a more diverse set 
of strategies aimed at business retention and expansion. One method that has 
been successfully used domestically and internationally is the use of microloans 
to finance small businesses. One major component of microfinance strategies 
used abroad that allows for lower transaction costs is the use of Peer Group 
Lending Programs (PGLPs). This paper first reviews the cited social, political, 
and financial reasons for the lack of such programs in U.S. microfinance 
initiatives. It simultaneously addresses why these American characteristics may 
not be as limiting as touted to be and proposes a hypothesis that certain groups 
may be well aligned to take advantage of a PGLP financing mechanism. 
Beginning farmers associated with farm incubators are targeted as a group for 
such consideration due to their affiliation with a local food system, the expected 
social cohesion among them, and their likely need for alternative means of 
financing. This hypothesis is tested with a survey of such farmers and analysis of 
their responses. The results indicate that there is some support for PGLPs 
amongst incubator farmers. Based on the survey responses, those who are 
heavily reliant upon farmers and mentors only within their incubator and those 
that are willing to borrow from other sources represent the most promising 
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The desire for economic development is not limited to developing 
countries. In the United States, agencies at every level of government, as well as 
a host of independent organizations and university centers, are devoted to the 
subject. In the midst of a recession that has lasted nearly five years, cities and 
states across the nation are now especially focused on developing strategies to 
increase employment and economic activity within their jurisdictions. Since the 
Great Depression era, there has been a focus in U.S. policy on attracting large 
companies from other locations via incentives such as tax abatements, 
subsidies, and low-rent land. Starting in the late 1970s with the decline of federal 
funding for local economic development programs, states and municipalities 
have begun shifting their focus from competitive first wave economic 
development approaches, often referred to as “smokestack chasing”, to a 
broader range of strategies aimed at business retention and expansion (Eisinger, 
1988, Bradshaw and Blakely, 1999, Shaffer and Marcouiller, 2006). One method 
that has been successfully used outside of the United States is the use of 
microloans to finance small businesses. The microloan finance strategy was 
pioneered in the mid-1970s in Bangladesh by Professor Muhammad Yunus and 
has since grown to be implemented in over 100 countries (MixMarket.org, 2012).  
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 Critical to the success of microfinance and Yunus’ award of the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2006 has been the innovative use of peer group lending programs 
(PGLPs). PGLPs rely on peer influence by a group of self-selected individuals to 
encourage loan repayment. The group members are also often held responsible 
for defaults by their peers. This shared responsibility leads to an effective 
selection of reliable borrowers in a market without credit histories and collateral 
on which to rely.  The group members’ willingness to “back” their peers also 
reduces lender risks and costs. Knowledge embedded in social relationships 
serves a similar function as more bureaucratic routines like credit checks do in 
the developed world. However, since microfinance’s debut in America in the late 
1970s, the use of PGLPs by U.S. microfinance institutions (MFIs) has greatly 
decreased, and they are rarely used today. Based on a 2010 survey, only 6% of 
respondent MFIs offered a PGLP strategy (FIELD, 2008 and 2012a).  
This research begins with a review of the literature on microlending in the 
United States. In particular, it explores the reasons for minimal use of PGLPs in 
the U.S. and how that limits the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. MFIs. 
Crucial to this exploration is the effect of social capital on the reliance on PGLPs. 
Thus, a discussion of social capital literature follows. Based on this knowledge, 
this paper argues that there is an unrecognized opportunity to identify U.S. 
markets in which social capital exists such that PGLPs can be incorporated.  The 
proposal identifies local food systems as such a market, based on their reliance 
on local farmers who often interact with and rely upon each other for various 
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services and product fulfillment and regularly interact with their clients.  It then 
outlines a research project designed to test the possibility of using peer group 
lending programs, in conjunction with other training and business development 
services, in the U.S. The chosen market for this study consists of small farmers, 
particularly those already invested in local food systems, as identified by 
participation in a farm incubator. The project involved preliminary conversations 
with farmers and farm incubator staff to identify and refine crucial issues to this 
inquiry. Once that framework was established, a survey frame was developed 
using member lists of farm incubators, and a survey was created and conducted 
via an internet application to garner farm incubator participant perspectives on 
the subject. Each set of questions is summarized to provide a basic 
understanding of the respondents, their farm incubation participation, and the 
challenges and opportunities they identified. (See Appendix C for a full set of 
summary charts and statistics). Particular relationships are subsequently 
analyzed using Fisher’s exact tests, simple logistic regressions, and linear 
probability models. This analysis aims to answer the following question: Do 
farmers associated with farm incubators offer a market for the application of a 











Microfinance is a concept centered on one primary tool, microlending.  In 
his book Banker to the Poor, Muhammad Yunus (2007) explains the journey that 
led him to start a microlending enterprise in 1976, now known internationally as 
the Grameen Bank. One may recognize the name of the bank as the winner of 
the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. This largely successful strategy for poverty 
alleviation started when Yunus was shocked to witness the seemingly inevitable 
cycle of poverty experienced by the incredibly industrious village women in 
Jobra, Bangladesh. After speaking with one such woman, Sufiya Begum, a stool-
maker in Jobra, he discovered that she was unable to purchase the bamboo 
necessary to make her stools for a lack of twenty-two cents. Sufiya acquired the 
capital needed through a trader (or “middleman”) that would later pay about 
twenty-four cents for a finished stool, lending Sufiya a daily profit of only two 
cents. The small amount of profit was just enough to provide food and shelter for 
her family, and served as a better alternative to facing the usurious rates charged 
by local moneylenders. Yunus (2007) recognized that “the existing economic 
system made it absolutely certain that Sufiya’s income would be kept perpetually 
at such a low level that she would never save a penny and would never invest in 
 5 
expanding her economic base” (p. 48). After a week of collecting information on 
other villagers in Jobra, Yunus’s assistant discovered forty-two borrowers reliant 
on the traders for a total of only twenty-seven dollars.  
From such a small amount of money was born a big idea. Yunus (2007) 
realized that the biggest barrier to escaping poverty for these hard-working 
entrepreneurs was an inability to borrow at a reasonable interest rate. That 
incapacity stemmed from their lack of assets to use as collateral in order to 
secure a loan at a commercial bank. The problem represented a case of the 
chicken or the egg; which would come first to produce the other? Yunus’ solution 
hatched from creatively reimagining the “rules” by which the poorest of the poor 
could borrow and establish credit. Micro-loans were awarded to the “poorest” in 
this manner first in Bangladesh and increasingly in other parts of the world 
following the newly established Grameen model.  The term “poorest” was defined 
in 1995 by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest and the Microcredit 
Summit Campaign Committee as the bottom fifty percent of those below the 
poverty level and distinguished from the “poor” who were normally defined as all 
individuals below the poverty level (Yunus, 2007, p. 41).  
The original model consisted of making very small loans to those able to 
form a peer group of five individuals in similar situations. The peer group was 
used as a means of screening and monitoring members since each person was 
held accountable for defaults from any other group member. Such an 
arrangement reduced the moral hazard that might arise from lending to one’s 
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peers by decreasing the group’s willingness to approve loans for which they 
would likely be held accountable for repaying. Another problem inherent to 
lending is adverse selection which is typically addressed by banks with higher 
interest rates, though this prevents lower income individuals from gaining access 
to such loans. The peer group framework helped guard against adverse selection 
through the reliance on greater personal knowledge about each individual 
borrower and his/her preferred behaviors and propensity for risk-taking. The 
concept of peer group lending programs (PGLPs) was central to the new 
mechanism referred to as microlending. Yunus (2007) reasoned that using peer 
pressure in conjunction with the fact that the practically asset-less borrowers had 
no better alternative for improving their qualities of life would be enough to 
encourage repayment. He was right.  
The reported repayment rate as of August 2012 for the Grameen bank 
stood at 96.88% (Grameen Bank, 2012). This and other reported microloan 
repayment rates averaging between 95% and 98% are remarkable compared to 
the average repayment rates for other types of credit offered in the U.S., such as 
consumer credit, consumer loans, and mortgage/housing loans (Grameen 
Foundation, 2012; Euromonitor International, 2011). As one can see in Figure 1, 
the rates for microlending and other types of credit used to be comparable, but 
the latter have fallen greatly due to the recession. It is important to note that the 
average microlending repayment rates are based on those reported to 
Mixmarket.org, an online microfinance database which contains no data from 
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U.S. MFIs. Consumer credit has traditionally suffered the lowest repayment rates 
compared to other loans in the U.S., likely due in part to the high interest rates 
charged on consumer credit cards.  Repayment rates for small business loans in 
the nation are not reported annually, though a 2009 CNNMoney.com report 
pinned them at 91.6% and 88.1% in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Again, these 
rates were reported during the recession, yet still fell much below average 
microloan rates. Additionally, Bloomberg.com (2010) reported that small 
business loan defaults range from 4% to 14% for the nation’s largest lenders.  
Figure 1: Average Loan Repayment Rates 
Source: Euromonitor International (2011) and Mixmarket.org (2012) 
 
United States Applications 
 After seeing the international success of microlending strategies, it was 
only a matter of time before the United States adopted this practice as a tool to 
enhance entrepreneurship and reduce poverty. Around the same time 
























several groups in the United States were already creating institutions with similar 
goals. ShoreBank Corporation was founded in 1973 in Chicago to serve the 
underbanked (those typically excluded from mainstream banking for various 
reasons discussed in greater detail below) in the city’s South Shore area. The 
organization served to advance inclusionary financing with multiple branches in 
several states for 37 years before closing in August 2010 after facing a shortage 
of capital during the “great recession” (Post & Wilson, 2011). Although the 
ShoreBank Corporation differed greatly from the Grameen Bank, it signified an 
understanding that financial exclusion was a real problem within the United 
States. As awareness about the field grew, so too did the number of microfinance 
institutions in the United States. According to the Opportunity Fund’s 
“Microlending in the United States: A Timeline History, 1973-2010”, 1981 marked 
a milestone for garnering national attention with segments on Oprah and 60 
Minutes about a microloan program for women based out of St. Paul Minnesota. 
By the late 1980s, awareness and support of microfinance was firmly established 
in the U.S. (Opportunity Fund, 2010).  
 The Aspen Institute’s Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, 
Learning and Dissemination, referred to in this document as FIELD (2010, 2012), 
estimates that the number of microenterprise development programs in the U.S. 
has continued its upward trend, growing from 84 in 1992 to 854 today.  With 
increased numbers has come enormous variety in microfinance models, and 
today many U.S. microfinance organizations are quite different from the 
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Grameen Bank. The two primary differences have been the relative lack of peer 
group lending strategies and the inclusion of business development services or 
other training programs offered by United States enterprises. Since the 
introduction of the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas (one of the first Grameen-style 
MFIs in the U.S.), attempts to use PGLPs in the U.S. context have been met with 
mixed reviews (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008, p. 16).  
 Research on microfinance practice in the U.S. shows this lack of PGLPs 
to be widespread.  For instance, Hung (2003) noted that the Aspen Institute 
reported 53 PGLPs in their 1996 Directory of Microenterprise Programs. Since 
then, that number has declined according to FIELD’s U.S. Microfinance Census, 
conducted in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, 15 out of 141 microenterprise 
development programs (reporting their lending methodologies) offered peer or 
group-based loans in addition to individual loans. In 2010 the number of 
programs reporting peer group lending stayed at 15, while the total number of 
programs increased 67% to 235 as seen in Figure 2. Additionally, 1 program 
(.7%) reported sole reliance on peer loans in 2008 compared to 6 such programs 
(2.5%) in 2010. FIELD also reports that the number of programs providing 
business development services has increased from 72% (266 out of 369 
reporting) in 2008 to 97% (356 out of 366) in 2010.  These statistics support the 
notion that “the earliest U.S. programs started with loans, but now focus on 
training” (Schreiner and Woller, 2003, p. 1574). 
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 This shift from lending to business development services leads one to 
question how microfinance can exist when loans are limited. Edgcomb, Klein, 
and Clark (1996) report that a majority of microenterprise development 
organizations offer solely technical assistance to a large amount of their clients. 
This perhaps explains their reference to microenterprise development 
organizations as opposed to microfinance institutions (MFIs). The similarity in 
terms is indicative of the blurred distinction in the U.S. between microfinance and 
more general support for microenterprise and small business. This research is 
concerned with the former, whether or not it provides the additional services that 
the latter do. 
 
Figure 2: U.S. PGLPs Compared to Total U.S. Microenterprise Development Programs 













Obstacles to U.S. Implementation 
 Microfinance programs in the United States operate in a much different 
context than those in Bangladesh, India, or Latin America. Similar to most other 
economic development strategies, microfinance models must be adapted to fit 
the inherent political, social, and economic environments in which they are 
immersed. Unfortunately, many microfinance programs have been implemented 
in the U.S. without first acknowledging that such changes needed to be made. As 
cited by Morduch (2000), Hulme and Mosley (1996, p. 135) state: 
 Ironically, it is the success of the “first wave” finance-for-the-poor 
 schemes, and particularly the Grameen Bank, that is the greatest obstacle 
 to future experimentation. Most designers and sponsors of new initiatives 
 have abandoned innovation, and “replication” is leading to a growing 
 uniformity in financial interventions. (p. 627). 
 
It appears as though American microfinance programs have been the result of 
selective replication rather than innovation. Through this process, the primary 
component of microfinance (the use of PGLPs) has been removed, and U.S. 
MFIs have reverted to simply small business development. As such, over the 
past 30+ years the challenges listed in Table 1 have been identified as barriers to 






Table 1: Challenges to U.S. Microfinance and Supporting Authors 
 
 These challenges are reviewed in turn below. They are divided into two 
groups of thought. The first three challenges listed in Table 1 fall into the “we 
don’t need microfinance in the U.S.” category while the final two obstacles fit the 
“it won’t work here” mentality. After challenges in the first group are each 
explained and disputed, the second group is addressed with attention drawn to 
the inapplicability of these arguments due to their exclusion of PGLPs in their 
definition of microfinance, leading to critiques of programs that are something 
else entirely. Finally, the literature addressing the inability to implement peer 
group lending programs in the U.S. is reviewed (Buckland and Hay, 2012; 
Servon, 2006; Hung, 2003; Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Schreiner and Morduch, 
2001; Bhatt and Tang, 1998, 2001; Besley and Coate, 1995). 
Challenge (as compared to 
lesser developed countries) 
Cited by: 
It is much easier to access 
alternative forms of credit in 
the U.S. 
Schreiner and Morduch, 2001, Hung, 2001 
The relative size of the 
market for microenterprises 
in the U.S. is small. 
Schreiner and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and 
Morduch, 2001, Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, 
1996 
Competition from large scale 
producers and distributors 
is greater in the U.S. 
Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008, Schreiner 
and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and Morduch, 
2001 
There are many more 
enforced regulations in the 
United States. 
Buckland and Hay, 2012, Yunus, 2003, 
Schreiner and Woller, 2003, Schreiner and 
Morduch, 2001, Bhatt and Tang, 1998 
It is just as difficult, if not 
more so, to obtain financial 
self-sufficiency for U.S. 
MFIs. 
Buckland and Hay, 2012, Quayes, 2012, 
Counts, 2008, Sengupta and Aubuchon, 
2008, Servon, 2006, Buckley, 2001, Bhatt, 
Tang, and Painter, 2001, Schreiner and 
Morduch, 2001, Bhatt and Tang, 1998 
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“We Don’t Need It” Arguments 
Access to Credit: 
 Schreiner and Morduch (2001) argue that the availability of credit to 
Americans not only limits the need for microfinance, but that it also makes the 
task of assessing microloan risks that much more difficult.  In developing 
countries, there are moneylenders that charge high interest rates (as mentioned 
in the first section of this paper) similar to the predatory lending “cash on 
demand” organizations in the U.S. However, Americans also have access to 
“fringe banks” (Caskey, 1994) such as pawnshops and check-cashing outlets, 
and most importantly, to credit cards. Schreiner and Morduch (2001) argue that 
the availability of these services reduces the need for microfinance, but other 
evidence suggests that this may not be the case.  
 While the poor in the U.S. certainly have easier access to credit than in 
other countries (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001), it is not clear that this access is 
universal or that it does not impose usurious rates. In fact, the National 
Consumer Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy organization focused on “advancing 
fairness in the marketplace for all”, reports that payday loan rates can exceed 
1,000% (NCLC, 2012). Microfinance was introduced in Bangladesh to provide 
financial access to those who otherwise had to resort to moneylenders and 
middlemen. Similarly, the strategy can and should be used domestically to aid 
the “underbanked”, or those whose financial needs are not fully met by traditional 
commercial institutions. These citizens consist of those with poor credit scores, a 
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lack of understanding about the mainstream banking system, limited or unstable 
incomes, those recently released from prison, and immigrants (Beard, 2010; 
Ledgerwood, 1999). Though the question of whether they would take advantage 
of microlending is an open one, there is no doubt that such groups exist in the 
U.S. 
 One indication of the demand for additional forms of credit in the U.S. is 
the fact that an entire industry has been created to offer services to the 
“underbanked” population. Buckland and Hay (2012) report that “in the United 
States, the payday lending industry was estimated to have revenues of around 
$40 billion in 2010” (p. 68). A recent study from the Center for Financial Services 
Innovation (CFSI) (2012) reports the “underbanked” market generated $78 billion 
in fees and interest payments in 2011, with an expected growth in the market of 
9% to achieve a total of $85 billion in 2012. The number of “underbanked” 
clientele also appears to be growing. The population was estimated by the FDIC 
to be about 43 million U.S. adults as of 2010 (Beard, 2010). Although reporting 
methodologies may slightly differ, CFSI (2012) reports that number has since 
grown to 68 million in 2011. These figures all support the idea of a large 
untapped demand for alternative means of credit at reasonable interest rates. 
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Figure 3: “Underbanked” Service Industry Growth (2010-2012) 
Source: Center for Financial Services Innovation 
 
 While fringe banks and payday lending are substantial, the most 
significant distinction between lesser developed nations and the U.S. regarding 
credit is Americans’ access to credit cards. However, with credit cards come 
credit scores. Whether a poor credit score is accrued through the misuse of 
these easily attainable cards or reliance on the previously mentioned predatory 
services is irrelevant.  The fact is that microfinance is intended to help those who 
are financially excluded to build their credit, and unfortunately, in America, this 
usually means assessing the risk of lending to those with poor credit as opposed 
to those with no credit as in developing countries (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001).  
Without reliance on peer group lending programs, MFIs may struggle with 
assessing an individual’s risk based on their character as opposed to their readily 
available credit history. Altering microfinance to meet the needs of those with 
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audience for microfinance in the United States, which according to the literature, 
is still relatively small. 
 
Size of the U.S. Market 
 Much of the literature refers to the size of the American market for 
microfinance in terms of the self-employment rate in the U.S.  An often cited 
comparison is that from Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996) that estimates the 
American self-employment rate to be 8-20%, or at the most, one third of the 60-
80% estimate for those in developing countries (p. 6). Another estimate offered 
by McKernan and Chen (2005) is that 11% percent of U.S. households own a 
small business, classified as having fewer than 500 employees (p. 2). One 
should note that these rates are based on existing self-employed populations 
rather than the potential markets that may exist for entrepreneurial activity.  
Similar to what was encountered in Bangladesh, one can see a case of the 
“chicken or the egg” in which low interest rate loans must be made available for 
the demand for entrepreneurial investments to be met, yet the need for such 
loans is not fully recognized until there is enough identified demand to deem it 
feasible. Additionally, the market for small business finance is relatively large 
when one considers that small businesses account for over 99% of the 5.7 
million U.S. firms (U.S. SBA, 2010). Microenterprises alone account for 60% 
(McKernan and Chen, 2005) where microenterprises are those businesses 
consisting of five or fewer employees (Servon, 2006).    
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 Schreiner and Morduch (2001) and Schreiner and Woller (2003) add to 
this debate by highlighting the notion that the average percentage of 
expenditures per person on microenterprise products or services is much smaller 
in the United States compared to the average in developing countries. However, 
there are certainly U.S. enterprises that lend themselves more readily to this type 
of consumerism, and their financial needs are important. Additionally, there have 
been recent pushes by communities to “buy local” in an attempt to enhance their 
economic multipliers and become more self-reliant (Shuman, 1998). Shuman 
identifies the need to focus on microeconomic perspectives to foster this self-
reliance and includes ten mechanisms that have already been implemented at 
some level in communities across the nation to help achieve such goals. Even 
with the emergence of state and local initiatives aimed at microenterprise and 
small business development, the following has been identified as the next 
challenge facing microentrepreneurs in the United States: competition from large 
scale producers and retailers. 
 
Large Scale Competition 
 The street vendor market of developing nations differs greatly from the 
highly corporate society built around economies of scale in the United States. 
American microentrepeneurs face much more competition in the product market 
from large scale producers, distributors, and retailers. Schreiner and Morduch 
(2001) and Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) use this to argue that there is more 
opportunity for microenterprise in the service sector in the United States, 
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especially within niche markets. While this may be the case, the U.S. service 
sector is often similarly corporatized. In fact, Schreiner and Morduch (2001) point 
out how large U.S. companies contribute to the plethora of low-skill, low-wage 
jobs offered domestically that are not typically available in developing nations. 
Although they do not specifically cite examples, these would include server or 
clerk positions with franchised restaurants, coffee shops, pharmacies, grocery 
stores, gas stations, and other retail establishments. The abundance of such 
positions detracts from the entrepreneurial incentives associated with the sectors 
that would otherwise attract small ventures (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001; 
Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008).  
 A primary example of how a microenterprise may face challenges due to 
its small size is introduced by Schreiner and Morduch (2001) and Schreiner and 
Woller (2003). They claim a prospective entrepreneur is unlikely to obtain and 
operate a profitable small agricultural venture in the U.S., whereas the farming 
industry is one of the largest microenterprise sectors abroad. This is partly 
attributable to limited competition from small farmers producing a commodity for 
their own village’s consumption in lesser developing countries as differentiated 
from the landscape of large scale agricultural producers and distributors serving 
much broader markets in the United States. In addition to the evidence presented 
by these authors, it is important to note that U.S. federal policy favors large scale 
agribusiness with farming subsidies.  Since 1995, 74% of subsidy payments have 
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been distributed to the top 10 percent of subsidized farms, with almost two-thirds 
of the nation’s farmers receiving no subsidies at all (Sciammacco, 2011).   
 Not only do financial subsidies more heavily benefit large scale farmers, 
so too do other regulations regarding farm practices. In a paper commissioned by 
the Agribusiness Accountability Initiative, Mattera (2004) provides several 
compelling case studies detailing how U.S. farm policies have benefited 
agribusiness either through their explicit regulations or the way in which they are 
implemented. One example explained how the USDA addressed the major 
manure problems generated by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) 
by allowing conservation dollars from the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program (EQIP) to subsidize attempts by CAFOs to manage such issues 
(Mattera, 2004). CAFOs are “livestock facilities that house and feed 1,000 or 
more animal units in a confined area” (Mattera, 2004). Rather than addressing 
the inherent bias towards large scale farms, this type of regulation simply applies 
a band-aid to the issue while encouraging CAFOs.  This illustrates a piece of the 
next major deterrent from entrepreneurial activity in the United States: 
regulations.  
 
“It Won’t Work” Arguments 
Regulations 
 Almost every sector of the U.S. economy is subject to regulation of some 
kind by federal, state, or local government. Many of these regulations limit 
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American microentrepreneurial activity, often unintentionally (Schreiner and 
Morduch, 2001; Schreiner and Woller 2003). From the perspective of lenders, 
interest rate caps on banks and stipulations that only regulated depository 
institutions may retain deposits limit microfinance lenders’ abilities to become 
profitable, a goal which has garnered much attention in the literature and which 
will be discussed further in a later section (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Shreiner and 
Morduch, 2001). Though microfinance strategies are inherently aimed at offering 
relatively low interest rates, many argue that to sustainably continue their goals 
of poverty alleviation, MFIs must earn enough on their loans to re-invest in their 
operations. The issue of institutional financial self-sufficiency and the ability to 
meet market demands is not unique to the U.S. It still remains a challenge in the 
lesser developed countries who were first to implement microfinance. Krahen 
and Schmidt (1994) and Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke (1984) argue that 
experiments with interest rate caps have been more detrimental than beneficial in 
lesser developed nations (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001). 
 From the borrowers’ perspective, incentives are limited by the need to 
obtain building and operating permits and understand tax laws and zoning 
regulations. For many service-oriented ventures, business licenses are also 
required (i.e. child care, food service, and cosmetology), and child-labor laws 
prevent children from working for their parents. These regulations are daunting, 
but perhaps the biggest regulatory hurdle to microenterprise is the welfare 
system (Schreiner and Morduch, 2001). Yunus (2003) claims that the welfare 
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system in the U.S. poses a great challenge to microlending (p. 189). His 
statement represents a focus on the safety net that welfare provides the U.S. 
poor. Similar to the abundance of access to credit and low-skill jobs in the U.S., 
welfare programs discourage self-employment ventures. Welfare does this not 
only by providing basic necessities, but also by enforcing means or asset tests 
that ultimately penalize one for increasing his/her earnings and/or savings. 
Therefore, one may fear losing benefits necessary to sustain oneself while trying 
to accumulate the necessary pre-venture savings that are typically necessary to 
start a business. As Schreiner and Woller (2003) summarize, “The problem is 
less that limits on income and assets reduce public assistance and more that the 
limits kick in before a small firm can support its owner” (p. 1570).   
 Additionally, it has been challenging to prove that microenterprise 
activities meet the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) requirements 
imposed through the Clinton administration’s Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) (Schreiner and Morduch, 
2001). Such requirements include obtaining a job within a maximum of five years, 
allotting a certain amount of time to job searching, and maintaining a certain 
minimum level of assets (Personal responsibility, 1996). If one is prevented from 
saving money to use as seed capital and is forced to search for a job when they 
are truly interested in starting their own business, the battle will likely be a long, 
hard fought one, perhaps lasting longer than five years. However, the Obama 
administration has recently released a waiver for certain TANF regulations in 
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targeted areas. A July 2012 memo highlighted federal interest in increasing 
TANF waiver flexibility for innovative methods encouraging employment (U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services). Time will tell whether or not these 
innovative methods include microfinance strategies. 
 
Institutional Difficulty in Becoming Self-Sufficient 
 There is a dispute in the literature as to whether or not financial self-
sufficiency at the organizational level should be a goal of U.S. microfinance 
programs or if such a goal would be in direct conflict with the social mission of 
their practices. While this is not the primary focus of this paper, it is certainly a 
debate to be acknowledged as American MFIs have struggled with these 
competing ideas. This paper argues that true institutional self-sufficiency occurs 
when MFI’s successfully rely on PGLPs to reduce costs. Challenges to PGLP 
implementation in the U.S. will be discussed further in the next section. The 
aforementioned challenges of interest rate caps, limits on depository abilities for 
non-bank MFIs, competition from other credit sources, and a relatively smaller 
target market in the U.S. contribute to higher transactions costs for many U.S. 
lenders when compared to microfinance practices in developing countries. 
However, such arguments cannot be made for U.S. microfinance institutions if 
these MFIs are not utilizing PGLPs which serve as the major source for 
overcoming microlending transaction costs challenges. These incomplete 
arguments as addressed in the literature are reviewed here for the sake of 
comprehensiveness.  
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 In the U.S., upper limits on interest rates vary by state from an 8% cap in 
Alabama to 24% in Washington, D.C. (LoanBack, 2011).  Some states provide 
different benchmarks for various sized loans, and many provide exceptions for 
mortgage loans. For instance, North Carolina does not designate an interest rate 
limit for loans greater than $25,000, but loans with a principal amount smaller 
than that threshold are entitled to a cap. That cap is determined as the maximum 
between 16% or 6% greater than the latest published U.S. Treasury Bills rate 
(State of NC, 1979). North Carolina does not place an interest rate limit on 
mortgage loans, unless that loan is made for less than $10,000 and is not 
provided by an approved list of lenders (State of NC, 1979). South Carolina does 
not place a limit on loans in which a written contract is utilized, though the state 
distinguishes agricultural loans for less than $25,000 as a separate category, 
entitled to a 16% cap (State of SC, 1984). Understanding how one’s particular 
state’s usury law is constructed is the first step to determining what interest rates 
can be charged for various sized loans and how those limits will affect the ways 
in which the lending institution is structured (i.e. reliance on PGLPs, ability to 
raise funds, number and salaries of hired staff, etc.). 
 Additionally, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) requires 
regulated financial institutions to meet the needs of the communities within which 
they are situated, including low-income residents. The CRA calls for lending and 
depository services, but many MFIs are non-bank institutions such as NGOs that 
are not regulated as banks, and thus restricted from receiving deposits 
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(Schreiner and Woller, 2003), even though their mission may be to serve the 
needs of low-income residents. Thus, banks sometimes meet the requirements 
of the CRA by allowing local microfinance institutions to make loans on their 
behalf without evaluating the risks associated with those projects. This leads to a 
structure in which some MFIs are unable to accumulate savings deposits, 
reducing their services offered and their ability to sustain themselves through 
lean funding periods. At the same time this detracts from typical financial 
institutions’ incentives to develop innovative lending mechanisms for the CRA 
target audiences (Schreiner and Woller, 2003).  
 For these reasons, it has been well documented that achieving financial 
self-sufficiency has been a greater challenge for American MFIs than those in 
developing nations (Bhatt and Tang, 1998; Schreiner and Morduch, 2001; 
Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). They argue that to become sustainable entities, 
interest rates would need to be raised and the target market would have to 
expand, possibly defeating the intended purpose of microfinance.  Quayes 
(2012) evaluates the perceived trade-off between the two goals of self-
sustainability and poverty alleviation in his article “Depth of Outreach and 
Financial Sustainability of Microfinance Institutions”. He finds from the reporting 
MFIs that the financially sustainable organizations actually have greater poverty 
alleviation effects or “depth of outreach”. Thus, this trade-off may be an illusion 
caused by a failure to implement microfinance as designed. 
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 Servon (2006) and Counts (2008) also argue that strategies should be 
sought to encourage both financial sustainability and poverty alleviation, claiming 
that they are not mutually exclusive goals.  Additional arguments suggest there 
needs to be a focus on innovation and efficiency regardless of whether or not 
financial sustainability is achieved (Bhatt, Tang, and Painter, 2001; Buckley, 
2001; Morduch and Schreiner, 2001). Finally, when compared to other job 
creation, poverty alleviation, or economic development strategies, the cost-
effectiveness of microfinance programs are seen as reasonable (Sengupta and 
Aubuchon, 2008; Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark, 1996; Servon and Doshna, 2000). 
Again, the financial self-sufficiency arguments fail to acknowledge the necessity 
of PGLPs as a critical component of true microfinance programs. 
 
Inability to Implement Peer Group Lending Programs (PGLPs) 
 The aforementioned variations between U.S. and lesser developed 
nations’ microfinance strategies focus on fundamental differences between the 
political and economic frameworks within which each operates. These 
differences ultimately contribute to the difficulty faced in the United States to 
utilize the most important facet of the successful microfinance models used in 
Bangladesh and many other developing countries, peer group lending programs 
(PGLPs). Morduch and Schreiner (2001) argue that reliance on arbitrarily created 
(rather than self-selected) groups, uneven enforcement of joint liability, higher 
transportation  and opportunity costs associated with attending meetings, the 
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transient and individualistic nature of Americans, and a general lack of social 
capital preclude group lending strategies from being as effective in the United 
States as they have been abroad. For instance, in Bangladesh, the opportunity 
for women to interact with community members outside their family on a weekly 
basis is considered a privilege due to the religious practice of purdah that 
restricts women from leaving their homes (Yunus, 2003), whereas that same 
opportunity for interaction in the U.S. may be viewed as a burden on one’s time 
and resources (i.e. fuel, bus fare, time in other social or work-related activities, 
etc.).    
 Schreiner and Woller (2003) add further to the argument that the diverse 
nature of U.S. poor populations (which arguably detracts from social capital) 
prevents widespread successful use of American microfinance PGLPs. Of the 
various reasons given for the success of PGLPs elsewhere, and the relative lack 
of such success in using them in the United States, the most common appears to 
be a difference in the amount of social capital amongst the differing societies. In 
their discussions of PGLPs, Bhatt and Tang (1998, 2001), Buckland and Hay 
(2012), Servon (2006), Hung (2003, 2006), and Besley and Coate (1995) each 
highlight this difference as it relates to societies at large and more specifically, 
their poor populations.  
 Bhatt and Tang (1998) argue that there are three primary forms of PGLPs, 
two of which enforce joint liability, and each with varying degrees to which 
transaction costs are applied to the lenders and the borrowers (displayed in 
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Table 2 below). In the U.S., social capital tends to be lower than in environments 
with less formally educated populations and weaker legal enforcement (Guiso, et 
al., 2004). Additionally, Costa and Khan (2003) and Putnam (1993b) demonstrate 
that social capital reserves in America have been decreasing over the past 
quarter to half-decade due to increases in ability to travel, ethnic heterogeneity, 
and women’s participation in the workforce. Therefore, the transaction costs 
associated with initially building the social capital amongst groups of peer 
borrowers are often high for the lenders and borrowers involved with U.S. MFIs 
utilizing PGLPs (Bhatt and Tang, 1998). Bhatt and Tang (2001) later argued that 
many peer group lending programs in the U.S. did not acknowledge the 
difference in levels of existing social capital among poor in the U.S. and poor in 
lesser developed countries. Arguably, this lack of focus on variations in cultures 
has led to ineffective implementation of PGLPs and the ultimate notion that they 










Table 2: “Three Group Lending Arrangements and Distribution of Transaction Cost Burdens” 
Source: Bhatt and Tang, 1998 
 
 However, the relative levels of individualism, transience, and social capital 
in the United States may not be as ubiquitous as presented in the literature 
reviewed thus far. As Long (1988) points out, data supports the notion that 
Americans are rather mobile, yet what is not often reported are the varying levels 
of migration amongst different cohorts and the associated reasons for such 
moves. He finds that there is a higher propensity to migrate among younger, 
more educated populations and those that have moved before with the overall 
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amount of migration not increasing over the forty year period from 1940 to 1980. 
Most notably, Long (1988) highlights eight “main” reasons that account for 70 to 
80 percent of American interstate or interregional migrations, five of which pertain 
to employment or retirement. (p. 251). In support of such findings, he contrasts 
the surge of migration after WWII with an expanding economy and many skilled 
laborers to that of the decline in interstate moves associated with “well-educated 
baby boomers holding on to jobs in a slow economy” in the 1970s. Some 
occupations continue to lend themselves more readily to relocation than others. 
Macroeconomic forces should be accounted for as well, as the most recent 
recession has illustrated.  
 Additionally, Ellickson (1991) highlights the ability of “close-knit” groups in 
the U.S. to self-regulate in order to achieve welfare-maximizing norms for all 
involved parties. His research focuses primarily on the ways in which cattle-
farmers in Shasta County, California handle disputes. He then combines his 
observations from Shasta County, with knowledge of the “larger social-control 
system” to determine that welfare-maximizing norms exist amongst groups that 
share informal power and easily communicate information relating to such 
control. Ellickson notes that individuals could belong to several close-knit groups 
of various types, such as religious, residential, and work-related. The goal with 
PGLP implementation should be to target these existing groups that are also in 
need of capital investment. There are clearly such groups within the United 
States, one of which is described later in this chapter.   
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Insights into the Success (or lack thereof) of PGLPs  
 It is important to examine the “social capital” concept that appears to play 
such a significant role in the successful development of peer group lending 
programs. As highlighted by Robert Putnam (1993a), three forms of social capital 
are of critical importance: trust, social norms, and networks, with the first often 
arising mutually through the enforcement of the latter two. Putnam (1993a) 
considers literature from several influential economists and sociologists to 
conclude that “Norms such as those that undergird social trust evolve because 
they lower transaction costs and facilitate cooperation” (p. 172). As expressed in 
the previous section, the ability to lower transaction costs is crucial to the 
success of PGLPs.  
 Social capital lowers transaction costs in PGLPs by serving as collateral, 
just as other forms of capital often serve this purpose in commercial financial 
transactions. A major difference between social capital and other forms of capital 
(i.e. built, natural, and financial), however, is that social capital is considered a 
“moral resource” according to Albert Hirschman (Putnam, 1993a, p. 169). This 
concept implies that the supply of social capital actually increases with 
consumption and disappears with the lack of it. Several ways in which social 
norms can be used and therefore enhanced are enumerated by Flora and Flora 
(2008). These include, the creation of groups, the subsequent interaction within 
(bonding) and between (bridging) groups, visioning, and participating in 
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collaborative pursuits (p. 117). Successful peer lending groups represent several 
of these activities.  
 An additional concept that separates social capital from other traditional 
forms of capital is that it is often provided as a public good. “Like all public goods, 
social capital tends to be undervalued and undersupplied by private 
agents…This means that social capital, unlike other forms of capital, must often 
be produced as a by-product of other social activities” (Putnam, 1993a, p. 170). 
For example, social capital may not initially exist amongst a group of individuals, 
but through regular exchanges, they are likely to become familiar with each 
other’s dispositions, abilities, and interests and to evaluate each other’s 
trustworthiness. Hence, mutual trust (as a form of social capital) is established 
through multiple interactions. A common fear associated with the provision of 
public goods is that “free riders” and “shirkers” will benefit from the availability of 
a good while limiting their contributions toward its provision. Putnam (1993) 
highlights the ability of informal savings and loan platforms known as rotating 
credit associations (RoCAs) to overcome these fears through reliance upon 
norms and networks of reciprocity. Yunus (2007) alludes to the fact that PGLPs 
are institutions similarly able to take advantage of such existing norms and 
networks when he claims they are “enterprises driven by an attitude of ‘social 




Local Food Systems 
Defined 
 Over the past couple decades there has been a growing awareness of 
and interest in local food systems. This has been demonstrated by the 
introduction of new terms and concepts such as the “slow food movement”, 
“localism”, and even the New Oxford American Dictionary’s 2007 word of the 
year: “locavore” (a person who eats primarily food grown within a certain radius 
deemed local), as well as related initiatives instituted at the federal, state, and 
local levels (Martinez, et al., 2010). Examples include the “Know Your Farmer, 
Know Your Food” program implemented at the national level and branding 
strategies such as the “Certified South Carolina” campaign targeted at product 
promotion within the state. Across the nation there have also been (rather 
successful) local and statewide efforts to encourage growth in the number of 
available farmer’s markets. Tropp (2010) reports USDA findings that the number 
of farmer’s markets in the United States increased 200% from only 1,775 
markets in 1994 to 5,274 in 2009 (p.11). Similarly, community supported 
agriculture (CSA) ventures have exploded from only 2 in the mid 1980’s to an 
estimated 3,400 as of 2010 (Tropp, 2010, p. 12). However, farmer’s markets and 
CSAs are only two pieces of typically larger, more complex food systems.  
 Although there is no agreed upon definition for local food systems, 
Martinez, et al. (2010) have summarized their general characteristics in their 
Economic Research report Local Food Systems: Concepts, Impacts, and Issues. 
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The report concludes that local food systems are classified based on geography 
as well as “social and supply chain characteristics” (p. 3). What constitutes a 
local geographical region for food systems is dependent upon population density 
and the subjective assessments of individuals. The distinguishable supply chain 
facets consist of direct-to-consumer marketing and direct-to- retail/foodservice 
marketing. Direct-to-consumer marketing includes farmer’s markets, community 
supported agriculture (CSA), farm stands, community gardens, and pick your 
own (PYO) ventures, and direct-to-retail/foodservice marketing involves sales to 
restaurants, schools, retail stores, and hospitals (Martinez, et al., 2010). 
 Farm incubators offer yet another mechanism around which farmers are 
organizing. With the average age of American farmers approaching 60 years old 
(NASS, 2007a), many are recognizing the need to encourage young aspiring 
farmers to move into the field (Langston, 2011). Farm incubators are seen as one 
method of reaching out to a younger population of new farmers. Reducing the 
costs that would normally be placed upon one agricultural venture, an incubator 
provides shared resources from which multiple growers can take advantage. 
These resources include land, training, networking opportunities, marketing, and 
sometimes financing. Similar ventures targeting refugees and immigrants have 
been created to offer a feasible transition to American farming from the 




Alignment with PGLP Microfinance Models 
 As described above, local food systems rely heavily on small farms as 
their major source of food production. These small-scale farmers are not immune 
to the challenges described in previous sections such as access to America’s 
plethora of credit sources, regulations, and competition from large scale 
producers. However, the market of U.S. small farmers is ripe for microfinance 
lending for multiple reasons. 
 First, 91 percent of farms were identified as “small” in the 2007 U.S. 
Census of Agriculture. These 1.9 million small farms represent a market almost 6 
times greater than the estimated number of individuals served by microloans in 
2010 (FIELD, 2012a). Additionally, they serve an active market whose demand is 
represented by consumers’ higher willingness to pay for local products compared 
to others (Martinez, et al., 2010). Wimberly, et al. (2002) found that Americans 
perceive small and family farms as more desirable than large and corporate 
farms. They similarly demonstrate the willingness to pay notion with a national 
longitudinal survey in which Americans agreed 2:1 that family farms should be 
supported even if it led to increased food prices. A local food assessment survey 
conducted in Greenville, SC found that a majority of attendees at a health and 
food festival were willing to pay up to a 20% premium for ethically grown, healthy 
foods (County of Greenville, 2012).   
 The 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture further highlights the fact that three 
out of five primary small farm operators selling directly to consumers were 
 35 
“socially disadvantaged” women and minorities (Martinez, et al. 2010). The 
Census confirms the trends of increasing ethnic, racial, and gender diversity 
among farmers (NASS, 2007a). Interestingly, women and minorities are groups 
that are often targeted for microfinance loans in the United States (Edgcomb, 
Klein, and Clark, 1996). The recent creation of farm incubators geared towards 
certain minority and immigrant residents (i.e. Seattle Tilth and the Somali Bantu 
Community Association of New Hampshire) highlights the ability of local food 
systems to incorporate these typically disadvantaged populations into a 
mainstream industry.  
 The fact that Martinez et al. (2010) describe local food systems not only by 
geographic boundaries but also by social characteristics is telling. Their findings 
included farmers’ reliance on one another to help fill gaps in demand, especially 
those in multi-farm CSAs. Rogers, et al. (1988) imply that U.S. farmers have 
learned to rely on one another out of necessity, noting their increased 
organization since the national landscape has changed from one of many self-
sufficient farmers to one in which a small percentage of the population works in 
the industry. They argue that farmer organizations such as farm bureaus and the 
National Farmers Organization (NFO) evolved for educational, economic, and 
political reasons.  The authors also devote attention to the importance of farmer 
cooperatives, voluntary organizations that require collaboration to benefit from 
shared costs of certain business functions. According to the National Council for 
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Farmer Cooperatives, all two million American farmers belong to at least one co-
op (2010).  
 Though maybe not referred to in such terms, farmer organizations have 
existed for centuries prior to official farm bureaus and co-ops and have continued 
to evolve with new challenges arising over time. For example, in the western 
United States, public or community acequias have been used since at least the 
late 16th century, upon Spaniard settlement (Hutchins, 1928). Acequias are 
institutions in which farmers demonstrate their ability to share responsibility for 
the maintenance and allocation of a valuable resource critical to their work in 
times of bounty and scarcity. In their review of the Culebra Watershed in 
Colorado, Hicks and Peña (2003) detail the continued reliance on the principles 
of the acequia institution today. They anecdotally report an instance in which one 
farmer allowed another to farm some of his land during the 2002 season in which 
the latter farmer’s acequia was not allocated its scheduled annual water 
distribution. The authors report that even in the face of superseding prior 
appropriation laws (which do not allow diversion of water from one farmer’s land 
to another), farmers continue to collaborate and support one another as they face 
the persistent challenge of water scarcity. This challenge has led to the creation 
of a similar resource management institution known as mutual water companies, 
many of which originated in the mid-1800s and continue to operate today 
(Russell, 1939). These mutual water companies allow agricultural users to self-
govern the allocation of their shared water supply and are oftentimes able to 
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avoid public utilities regulations (Strickland, 2011). To use Ellickson’s term, 
farmers collaborating in such a way are creating “order without law” or at least a 
different order than would result with sole reliance on the formal legal system.   
 Martinez et al. (2010) additionally provided the following insight regarding 
the importance of social features in successful local food systems: 
 The concept of local food may also extend to those who produced the 
 food: the personality and ethics of the grower; the attractiveness of the 
 farm and surrounding landscape; and other factors that make up the ‘story 
 behind the food’. (p. 4). 
 
Although Sage (2003) focused on southwest Ireland, he also highlighted the 
significance of mutual trust in the success of what he termed good food networks 
(similar to local food systems as they have been referenced in this paper). In 
their discussion of local food system benefits, Hughes, et al. (2007) refer to 
Goldschmidt’s 1946 conclusion that there exist a strong connection between 
small-scale production and community well-being, with not only economic 
benefits, but more importantly, social benefits accruing to community members. 
These theories and their possible applications to our nation’s current local food 
systems underscore the potential of small farmers involved in such systems to 
take advantage of the cost-mitigating and capital building tool of PGLPs.  This 








Developing the Survey Instrument 
 This study aimed to empirically test the hypothesis that small farmers 
participating in farm incubators provide a suitable target audience capable of 
capitalizing on peer group lending programs. To test this major hypothesis, an 
online survey was developed. Initially, informal conversations with local farmers 
(who are not included in the sampling frame) in upstate South Carolina and 
thesis committee members proficient in survey design were conducted to help 
establish the essential framework and language for an online survey. Next, the 
survey was developed and pre-tested using cognitive interviews (as 
recommended by Dillman, 2009) with additional farmers from outside the sample 
population, as well as farm incubator staff, to identify and address areas of 
redundancy, confusion, and concern. The cognitive interviews were conducted 
over the phone while respondents took the survey online, to gather feedback 
regarding wording, as well as navigational issues. The survey was then revised 
to its final version based on the feedback received from cognitive interviews in 
accordance with online survey methodology and phrasing recommendations from 
Dillman (2009) and posted to an online survey site in both English and Spanish 
versions.  
 The final survey contained questions addressing the demographics of 
farm incubator participants and the characteristics of the incubators themselves 
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in the hopes of shedding light on these relatively new institutions and the 
individuals that they attract. The questions relating to the participants included 
those regarding age, race, nationality, whether or not the individual was Hispanic, 
gender, challenges faced in becoming profitable farmers, and participation status 
with the incubator (current or past). Questions relating to the incubator included 
those regarding the duration of participation in the program, the number of 
participants involved, and the services offered. Additionally, questions were 
asked to gauge whether or not this population lends itself to a PGLP model of 
microfinance and to what extent the challenges identified in the literature affect 
one’s willingness to participate in such a program. The development of these 
questions is detailed below, addressing each in terms of the role it played in 
answering the three major hypotheses of this study and the expectations 
underlying those hypotheses.  
 The underlying expectations of the study were that willingness to 
participate in PGLPs would be largely positive among farm incubator 
respondents and that social capital would exist among them. Social capital was 
expected to manifest itself both within the incubator (representing intra-group 
“bonding” social capital) and with groups extending beyond the incubator 
(demonstrating the wider networks associated with local food systems, or 
“bridging” social capital). After providing definitions of microfinance and peer 
group lending programs, the general willingness to participate in PGLPs was 
tested with the following two questions.   
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1. Thinking of several colleagues whom you trust, would you be willing to 
form a peer group and participate in a PGLP as defined above, in which 
you would all be responsible for repayment of each other's loans, thus 
reducing the interest rates available to you? 
 
If a respondent answered “No” or “Not sure” to this question, he/she was asked 
the following question based on the understanding from Bhatt and Tang that 
PGLPs are sometimes implemented without joint liability, though the transaction 
costs burdens are shifted more heavily toward the financial institution, reducing 
the amount by which interest rates may be lowered. 
2. Would you be more willing to participate in a PGLP if shared liability for 
each other's loans was not enforced, thus slightly reducing interest rates 
available to you, but not as much as in the previous scenario of a 
traditional PGLP? 
 
The responses to these questions were also used as the dependent variable in 
assessing the effects various other aspects had on one’s willingness to 
participate, items which will be addressed in more detail later in this section.  
 The notion that social capital existed among farm incubator participants 
was assessed using the following questions. 
1. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other farmers 
associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance? 
 
2. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other local farmers 
not associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance?  
 
3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following four 
statements? 
 Most other farmers associated with my incubator face the same 
challenges I do. 
 I share similar values with most other farmers associated with my 
incubator. 
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 Most other farmers associated with my incubator come from a 
similar background as me. 
 I feel that I can easily relate to most other farmers associated with 
my incubator. 
 
4. Apart from the incubator, are you involved in any local level organizations, 
groups, associations, or programs that relate to farming (such as a 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) group, mutual water district, 
producer association, Farm to School program, etc.)? 
 
Based on the literature, those that are underbanked, or have financial needs not 
currently being met by the traditional commercial banking system should be the 
targets of microfinance. To test whether respondents had a general financial 
need the first four of the following five questions listed were asked with the final 
question addressing the current likelihood of having one’s financial needs met by 
various institutions.  
1. Not including credit card use, have you taken out any loans to secure 
resources for your farming business in the past year?  
 
2. Considering these loan(s) you received over the past year for your farming 
business (from banks, credit unions, family members, etc.), in what range 
would you estimate the total amount falls? Please do not include credit 
card usage. 
 
3. Have you used a credit card to secure resources for your farming 
business in the past year? 
 
4. Approximately how much have you charged to your card(s) in the past 
year? Please only consider charges for acquiring resources for your 
farming business. 
 
5. Currently, how likely or unlikely are you to use the following resources to 
obtain capital for your farming business? 
 Credit card 
 Commercial bank loan 
 Credit union loan 
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 Loan from a friend or relative 
 Farm incubator loan 
 Savings 
 Government loan (Ex. Beginning Farmer and Rancher loans) 
 
Claims that higher transportation and opportunity costs reduce American interest 
in PGLPs were tested with the following questions. 
1. On average, how much time does it take you to travel one way from home 
to your incubator?  
 
2. On average, how many times a month do you meet with others (farmers, 
mentors, staff, etc.) from your incubator? 
 
3. Are you required by your incubator to attend meetings/events away from 
the incubator (such as farmers markets, training classes, etc.)? 
 
4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three 
statements? 
 I feel that required meetings/events with other farmers are worth my 
time. 
 I feel that required meetings/events with current or potential 
customers are worth my time. 
 I feel that required meetings/events with mentors, staff, and trainers 
are worth my time. 
 
Finally, to control for differentiation between costs of living associated with 
metropolitan versus non-metropolitan areas and to account for more general 
regional differentiation, questions were asked regarding the respondent’s zip 




Developing the Survey Frame 
 Once the survey was developed, the sampling frame had to be 
established. As previously mentioned, the sampling frame consisted of farm 
incubator participants. This decision was based on their involvement in local food 
systems, their interactions with mentors, clients, and other farmers, and their 
anticipated need for financial capital as beginning farmers. Specifically, adult 
U.S. citizens or permanent residents who spoke English or Spanish fluently were 
targeted due to the study’s focus on U.S. PGLPs and the American context within 
which a program might operate. The most comprehensive record of U.S. farm 
incubators was identified as Tufts University’s New Entry National Incubator 
Farm Training Initiative (NIFTI) database. Starting with this database, two 
Canadian incubators, several college training programs, organizations currently 
only recognized as potential incubator sites, and several programs only serving 
refugees were disqualified for this particular study. Additionally, four incubators 
(one in SC, one in NC, and two in OR) were added to the list based on 
recommendations from other incubator staff. In the end, there were 21 U.S. 
incubators with 265 farmers currently or recently (within the past five years) 






Implementing the Survey 
 Staff members associated with the farm incubators listed in Appendix A 
were contacted by phone to explain the purpose of the survey and to ask for 
willingness to provide contact lists for their current and recent (within the past 5 
years) participants. If unable to distribute their members’ contact information, a 
request was made for someone in the organization to serve as a liaison that 
would disseminate all pertinent survey information to those farmers currently and 
recently associated with their incubator. Dillman (2009) recommends making five 
contacts for mail surveys to reduce non-response rates and sampling error. 
Although the contacts differed from a mail survey in that the contact letters were 
not sent by third-class postal mail, a combination of phone and email 
correspondence was used to encourage participation. Dillman (2009) highlights 
that what is of most importance is not necessarily the total number of contacts, 
but the differentiation between each successive one. To ensure that such 
differentiation was accomplished, Dillman’s template for successful email 
reminders was revised to apply to this particular study. Additional calls were also 
made to ensure the sampling frame count was updated based on the actual 
number of farmers contacted by incubator staff. The final count of 265 contacted 
farmers and a useable 84 out of 102 survey responses resulted in a 32% 






 The collected survey data was coded and ultimately analyzed using 
statistical software (STATA) to determine if PGLPs could be used as a financing 
tool for small and start-up farmers in farm incubators. The results were first 
divided into the following categories upon which different analyses were 
performed: demographics, information regarding the incubators, and dependent, 
independent, and control variables measuring participants’ willingness to 
participate in PGLPs. The demographic information was totaled and graphed to 
provide a picture of what the farm incubator population looks like. Similar 
measures were taken with the incubator information to determine what 
characterizes these institutions across the U.S. Finally, the dependent variables 
of willingness to participate in a Peer Group Lending Program with and without 
shared liability were analyzed separately using Fisher’s Exact Test to determine 
if any relationship was present with twenty-five independent variables in the 
following categories: social capital, financial capital access, transportation costs, 
and opportunity costs (a full list can be found in Appendix B). Once basic 
statistically significant relationships were identified, Simple Logistic Regressions 
and Linear Probability Models were run on those combinations of variables to 
determine the effect that each had on the outcome of willingness to participate in 
a PGLP either with or without joint liability. 
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 The analyses performed serve to test the following expectations. It was 
predicted that the results of the survey would show that social capital and strong 
networks exist among farmers participating in farm incubators, though the 
respondents were likely to possess social capital generated from sources beyond 
the incubator itself. Additionally, it was expected that the willingness of farmers to 
participate in a PGLP structure would be largely positive, associated with social 
capital measures and the need for access to financial capital. Farmers’ 
willingness to participate in PGLPs were anticipated to be negatively associated 
with increased transportation costs and perceived opportunity costs. While 
findings from this sample may not allow for statistical inferences to be made 
regarding the larger small farm population, reasonable deductions can be made 













FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Respondent and Incubator Characteristics  
 The survey respondents are demographically similar, with the most 
noticeable differences being gender and incubator participation status. The study 
participants are primarily (83%) white, with all but six out of 78 born in the United 
States, and only one out of 75 respondents is Hispanic. As seen in Figure 4 
below, 75% are between the ages of 26 and 45.  
 
Figure 4: Age of Survey Respondents 
The majority of respondents live in metro regions, with 69 out of 75 living in 
Metropolitan areas, 3 in micropolitan areas, 1 in a small town, and 2 in rural 
areas according to the Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA 2.0) Codes based 
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major demographic variations are gender and incubator participation status as 
seen in Figures 5 and 6. Based on the proclivity of typical microfinance programs 
to lend to women, the relationship between gender and willingness to participate 
in a PGLP was examined using Fisher’s Exact Tests, but with p-values of .161 
with liability and .223 without shared liability the associations were not statistically 
significant. 
 
 The incubator programs also appear similar based on the responses to 
questions regarding incubator size, services offered, and length of program 
participation. The majority of incubators were relatively small, as seen in Figure 
7. In an effort to provide a better understanding of the number of incubators in 
each size category rather than the number of participants in each sized 
incubator, the responses were grouped based on zip code data. One might 
expect the small program size to encourage social capital amongst members and 
foster an environment conducive to PGLPs. However, the small cohorts could 
49% 
51% 
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also mean that there are few peers among which to select as a group of 
borrowers, limiting one’s willingness to participate in a shared liability program. 
This is something reviewed in more detail in the following section. 
 
Figure 7: Incubator Size 
 
 The length of time one participates in an incubator program may appear at 
first to vary substantially, until the results are divided into categories of current 
and past participant responses (see Figure 8, below). Then it becomes apparent 
that the majority of previous incubator members participated for seven months to 
less than one year (basically a growing season) with greater variation among 
current participants. One might expect the difference in duration to play a role in 
relationship building and willingness to participate in PGLPs, however there was 
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Figure 8: Participation Duration 
 
 The services offered by the incubators included all ten categories 
identified in the survey question (see Figure 9, below) in addition to “mentorship”, 
a response which was written in by two individuals from different incubators. The 
other write-in responses to the question regarding incubator-offered services 
provided more detailed explanations of arrangements that mostly overlapped the 
categories of training (education), networking, and equipment. The incubator-
offered services were totaled by responses, not by incubator since some 
programs place participants on various sites with different amenities, incubators 
may have altered their formats and offerings from one class to another, and what 
is ultimately important is not which services are offered, but which ones are most 
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 Figure 9 depicts the percentage of respondents recognizing a service was 
offered by their incubator (“offered”), and the relative utilization of those services 
(“utilized”). For instance, what one quickly learns is that land is not often sold by 
incubators (only 9% of respondents were offered that option), but 100% of those 
respondents who had access to land for sale took advantage of that service, 
indicating the likely need for such arrangements. This particular option was 
offered by two programs in the West, one in the Northeast, and one in which the 
location is unknown, indicating affordable land may not be a location specific 
demand. Additionally, it is not likely that participants in search of such a service 
would have self-selected these programs, since the incubators are widely 
dispersed geographically. Supporting this notion were the responses to what 
study participants ranked as their greatest challenges to becoming profitable 
farmers, an issue to which will be returned in a following section. The next 
section reviews the results of the three hypothesized relationships expected to 




Figure 9: Percentage of Respondents with Access to Services and Relative Utilization 
 
Hypotheses  
 As suggested by the literature review, there are three primary hypotheses 
which this study aimed to test. They include the following: (1) Social capital and 
willingness to participate in a PGLP will be positively correlated; (2) Need for 
access to financial capital and willingness to participate in a PGLP will be 
positively correlated; (3) Transportation and associated opportunity costs will be 
negatively correlated with willingness to participate in PGLPs. Additionally, these 
hypotheses are based on the expectations that social capital would exist among 
incubator participants and that willingness to participate in PGLPs would be 
largely positive among them. These will each be addressed in turn in this section 













 The first hypothesis is that social capital as captured by several ordinal 
level measures will be positively associated with willingness to participate in 
PGLPs. The responses to the social capital questions reveal that most survey 
participants do exhibit social capital amongst their farmer peers. About 75% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with three of the four questions regarding 
social capital among their incubator cohort. The one incongruity was the question 
addressing whether or not participants felt they came from similar backgrounds 
with which only 20% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. This was the 
case despite the demographic results presented earlier and the strong affirmative 
response to the question regarding whether or not participants shared similar 
values. This anomaly may lend itself to further inquiry. What then are the 
differences among farm incubator participants that are perceived as creating 
various “backgrounds”? Do they relate to previous education or career choices, 
socio-economic status, or some other characterization? Do they detract from the 
social cohesion experienced among incubator cohorts?  
 For now, the “background” question was given extra attention by 
producing two separate social capital composite mean scores for each 
respondent; one including the background response and one excluding it. 
Additionally, those with an affirmative “background” answer were compared to 
those with a neutral or negative response. Each of these independent social 
capital variables were tested for relationships to one’s willingness to participate in 
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a PGLP using Fisher’s Exact Test. Results across each category were not 
significant, leading one to believe that the feelings an incubatee has regarding 
one’s comparative background with other participants does not significantly 
change the social dynamics of the group, or that the social cohesion among the 
members is not strong enough to promote a PGLP structure regardless of the 
“background” issue.   
 Other measures of social interaction included reliance on other farmers 
within and outside of the incubator program and affiliation with organizations or 
groups outside of the incubator. These were also tested for correlation with 
willingness to participate in a PGLP. At first, it appears as though there again is 
no significant relationship. However, when comparing the subset of respondents 
that reported a high degree of reliance on other farmers within the incubator but a 
low level of reliance on farmers outside of the incubator, a relationship becomes 
apparent. Fisher’s Exact results reveal that this group of individuals is more 
inclined to participate in PGLPs, either with or without shared liability enforced, 
the results of which are presented below in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 3: Fisher’s Exact Results - Strong “Within Incubator” Reliance with Willingness to Participate in a PGLP 
with Shared Liability 
   
Strong Reliance within 
Incubator, Low Outside 
 Willingness to Participate in 
a PGLP (with Liability) No Yes Total 
No  17 3 20 
Yes  12 10 22 
Total  29 13 42 
    
  
1-sided Fisher's Exact=.035  
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Table 4: Fisher’s Exact Results - Strong “Within Incubator” Reliance with Willingness to Participate in a PGLP 
without Shared Liability 
 
Hypothesis 2  
 The second hypothesis stems from the literature regarding the unbanked 
and underbanked populations. The expectation is that those who identified a 
need for access to financial capital are more willing to participate in PGLPs. 
Similar to the findings regarding the first hypothesis, the association between 
willingness to participate in PGLPs and measures of financial need were not 
statistically significant using Fisher’s Exact Tests. The variables included in these 
analyses were whether or not a respondent had used a credit card or taken out a 
loan for their farming venture in the past year, the rank he/she assigned to 
“access to financial capital” as a challenge to becoming a profitable farmer, and 
whether or not he/she utilized incubator-provided access to financial assistance 
or small business planning. The only significant relationship found was between 
the willingness to participate in a PGLP with relaxed assumptions (i.e. no joint 
liability) and whether or not a participant had used incubator-offered small 
business planning. The results of the Fisher’s exact test can be seen in Table 5.  
   
Strong Reliance within 
Incubator, Low Outside  
 Willingness to Participate in 
a PGLP (without Liability) No  Yes  Total  
No  19  3  22  
Yes  21  13  34  
Total  40  16  56  
    
 
 1-sided Fisher's Exact=.043  
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Table 5: Fisher’s Exact Results – Utilization of Business/Financial Planning Services with Willingness to Participate 
in a PGLP without Shared Liability 
A probable explanation would be that those who are using financial planning 
services are most interested in and open to various financing opportunities. 
However, this is not supported by tests for relationships among participants’ 
willingness to borrow from other sources and their utilization of incubator-
provided financial planning services. Perhaps those exposed to that education 
were specifically more willing to consider a financing option that involved low 
interest rates and little need for collateral due to their acquired knowledge of 
those benefits. However, they were only significantly more willing to participate in 
the PGLP option once conditions were relaxed, perhaps demonstrating their 
comprehension of the burdens imposed by shared liability. 
 The measures of willingness to borrow from other sources were tested for 
correlation with willingness to participate in a PGLP. Based on initial findings that 
significant relationships existed among such pairings, a composite mean was 
constructed to indicate an individual’s overall willingness to borrow. The value 
was calculated as the sum of willingness to use a credit card or borrow (on a five 
   Utilized Incubator-Provided 
Financial Planning Services 
 Willing to Participate in a 
PGLP (without Liability) 
No Yes Total 
No  8 8 16 
Yes  7 25 32 
Total  15 33 48 
  
1-sided Fisher’s Exact=.051 
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point scale ranging from “very unlikely” to “very likely”) from a commercial bank, 
credit union, incubator, friend or relative, and government, divided by six. Though 
the specification of logistic models more accurately represents a dichotomous 
dependent variable, linear probability models are simpler to interpret. Thus, both 
tests were run on the two measures of willingness to participate in PGLPs. With 
all four tests indicating statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, we can 
accept the linear probability results suggesting that for a one point increase in 
one’s willingness to borrow mean score, he/she is 39% more likely to participate 
in a PGLP with joint liability and 20% more likely to participate in a PGLP with 
relaxed conditions.  
Table 6: Simple Logistic Regression Results – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on 
Willingness to Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability 
Table 7: Linear Probability Model – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on Willingness to 
Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability 
PGLP with 
Liability Odds Ratio Std. Error z P> lzl 95% Conf. Interval 
Composite WTB  11.04342 7.81374 3.39 0.001 1.015068 3.788602 
Constant  0.0001276 0.000348 -3.39 0.001 6.08E-07 0.026782 
   
Number of obs =      42  
   
Prob > F      =  0.0000  
   
R-squared     =  0.3999  
   
Adj R-squared =  0.3849  
   
Root MSE      =  .39281  
PGLP with 
Liability Coefficient Std. Error t P> ltl 95% Conf. Interval 
Composite WTB 0.3935553 0.0762224 5.16 0 0.2395041 0.547607 
Constant -0.9762432 0.3058145 -3.19 0.003 -1.59E+00 -0.35817 
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Table 8: Simple Logistic Regression Results – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on 
Willingness to Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability 
 
Table 9: Linear Probability Model – Composite Willingness to Borrow (WTB) Mean Regressed on Willingness to 
Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability 
 
Hypothesis 3  
Based on arguments presented in the literature, increases in 
transportation costs and/or associated opportunity costs were expected to lead to 
decreases in willingness to participate in PGLPs. This hypothesis is broken into 
two pieces, with the transportation costs portion evaluated first. The expectation 
was tested with Fisher’s Exact Tests to analyze the possible relationships 
between willingness to participate in PGLPs (under the strict and relaxed 




Ratio Std. Error z P> lzl 95% Conf. Interval 
Composite WTB  2.817549 1.119694 2.61 0.009 1.293016 6.139585 
Constant  0.0452176 0.0674555 -2.08 0.038 2.43E-03 0.841643 
    
Number of obs =      51  
    
Prob > F      =  0.0036  
    
R-squared     =  0.1599  
    
Adj R-squared =  0.1428  
    
Root MSE      =  .43388  
PGLP without 
Liability Coefficient Std. Error t P> ltl 95% Conf. Interval 
Composite WTB 0.2020773 0.0661656 3.05 0.004 0.0691126 0.335042 
Constant -0.0949588 0.2629132 -0.36 0.72 -6.23E-01 0.433385 
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meets with others from his/her incubator each month, and whether or not one is 
required to attend meetings and events. None of the test results indicated 
significance among these variables.  
Perhaps, among this particular population, travel necessary for work and 
to interact with other farmers is not considered taxing, especially when compared 
to other challenges, such as the need for financial capital. After all, transportation 
costs are relative to what one expects in their chosen location, not to those faced 
in lesser developed countries. Additionally, transportation costs were ranked the 
lowest or second lowest challenge among respondents in all regions except the 
Midwest while access to financial capital was ranked the first or second greatest 
challenge in all four regions, demonstrating the relativity of the perceived travel 
cost constraint. Finally, the opportunity costs attached with such trips were 
mostly considered minor, an issue that is now addressed in more detail.  
 As mentioned earlier in the text, opportunity costs associated with 
interaction amongst peers is perceived to be higher in America than in lesser 
developed countries. This is assumed to detract from the willingness to 
participate in PGLPs, and is the final piece of hypothesis three examined in this 
study. Most respondents agreed or strongly agreed that attending meetings with 
other farmers, current and potential customers, and mentors were all worth their 
time. There was only one “disagree” response to the question regarding mentors 
and one “strongly disagree” response to the category of other farmers. Without 
much variation in responses, it is difficult to know if an increase in perceived 
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opportunity costs actually does detract from willingness to participate in a PGLP. 
As with the transportation costs measures, no significant relationships were 
found among opportunity costs measures and willingness to participate in PGLPs 
under relaxed or strict conditions.  
In the future, perhaps the response categories for such a question should 
use a scalar range to determine the estimated amount of value associated with 
such meetings.  In comparison to a scale that simply measures the degree to 
which one feels the meetings are worth his/her time, more variation would likely 
be attained asking for individual valuations. Additionally, the opportunity costs 
associated with meeting with other farmers or mentors for farming related 
education or discussion may be valued more or less than one would value 
meeting with the same peers for loan approvals. This question could be asked 
more directly to examine that difference. Again, it seems that the challenges 
posed by opportunity costs are relative to others faced by a farmer, such as the 
need for networking, mentorship, financial capital, et cetera.  
 
Additional Findings 
 In addition to the expected results of the study, several important findings 
regarding regional differences were identified from the survey results. One 
measure of interest was the relative survey response rates by region. The 
sampling frame was unevenly distributed across the country, so different 
numbers of responses were expected for each of the four U.S. regions. Though 
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almost 40% of the 75 respondents reporting residential zip code data resided in 
the West, the response rate for that region was the lowest (See Appendix C). 
Based on the number of farmers associated with each incubator, the response 
rate for the West was only 20%, compared with 59%, 55%, and 23% for the 
Northeast, Midwest, and South respectively (See Appendix C).  
 This could indicate that there are greater networks, increased levels of 
peer pressure, and more social cohesion among farmers in the Northeast and 
Midwest. Another possibility is that the issue of microfinance appealed especially 
to the farmers in those regions compared to others. Again, based on the 
literature, either of these notions would lead to the expectation for increased 
willingness to participate in PGLPs.  However, as seen in the Fisher’s Exact Test 
results below, the responses to the PGLP questions were pretty evenly split for 
farmers in the South and the Midwest with Western respondents most supportive 
of possible PGLP participation and Northeast participants revealing a preference 
not to participate whether or not shared liability is enforced. These results may 
not be statistically significant, but certainly highlight the possibility that peer 
networks and interest in finance may not be enough to encourage one to 
participate in a PGLP. Perhaps the abundance of farm incubators and farmers in 
the West also broadens the scope one has to choose from in selecting a peer 




Table 10: Fisher’s Exact Results – Willingness to Participate in a PGLP with Shared Liability and Region 
 
Table 11: Fisher’s Exact Results: Willingness to Participate in a PGLP without Shared Liability and Region 
  
 The most important and noticeable regional differences and similarities 
are those regarding the challenges incubator farmers face in becoming profitable 
farmers. Respondents were asked to rank only their top four challenges. Due to 
various perceptions and the ambiguity of assigning ranks from “greatest” to 
“fourth greatest”, it was determined that designating weighted values for each 
rank would be somewhat arbitrary and would likely skew the data. Thus, if an 





Liability  Midwest  Northeast  South  West  Total  
No  5  7  5  3  20  
Yes  4  4  5  13  26  
Total  9  11  10  16  46  
    





Liability  Midwest  Northeast  South  West  Total  
No  6  6  3 5  20  
Yes  7  5  7  20  39  
Total  13  11  10  25  59  
    
Fisher’s Exact= .159  
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additional ones that could be written in) it received equal weight. Therefore, 
Figure C-17 includes the ranked challenges for each region, with all rankings (1-
4) receiving equal weight and the regions weighted by number of respondents. It 
is apparent that land costs, equipment costs, time, and access to capital were all 
reported as the most challenging aspects of profitable farming across regions. 
This provides valuable insight into the services that are needed through incubator 
and other farm support programs. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 It is inherently difficult to measure social capital, and as these results 
reveal, the questions presented here were not exhaustive and could not capture 
the full range of social capital measures. The transportation and opportunity cost 
measures could have been asked in more direct ways to acquire differentiated 
and more substantial results. Another challenge was the limited participation in 
the Spanish version of the survey with only one respondent who was ultimately 
deemed ineligible to complete it. The Spanish version was generated by a 
Professor in the Clemson University languages department fluent in Spanish and 
English and adept at translation. However, due to limited resources, the Spanish 
version did not undergo a cognitive interview process similar to the English 
version, possibly leading to unintended and limited responses.  
 The two questions regarding PGLP participation could have been asked 
differently as well. In an effort to avoid acquiescence bias, the questions were 
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asked in a non-leading way. Full descriptions of what PGLPs typically entail were 
used, but the benefits were not touted as they would be by a microfinance 
provider. Even with written descriptions, the concept of a PGLP was likely new to 
many respondents and difficult to fully comprehend without the ability to ask 
questions and receive verbal feedback. Survey questions were asked leading up 
to the PGLP inquiries in an attempt to get participants thinking about this 
concept. First, social capital measures were addressed to encourage 
respondents to think about their relationships with their colleagues. Then, several 
questions about current financing strategies one used or was likely to use were 
asked to generate thoughts on available and accessible financing methods.  
However, the largest number of responses to both questions was “not sure”, a 
result that possibly could have been lessened with more straightforward 
questions or with the ability to explain in an interview setting what was fully 
meant by PGLP.    
 Finally, one challenge to the study design arose from the inability to 
distribute the survey to all farmers or all incubator staff. Some incubator staff 
preferred to send the survey and reminders to their farmers, while others 
provided their participants’ contact information for direct communication with the 
survey administrator. The farmers for whom contact information was obtained 
received their reminders in a timely manner. However, there were no means of 
knowing whether the same was true for the farmers being contacted by the 
incubator staff acting as liaisons. On the contrary, those that were being 
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contacted and reminded directly may not have been as likely to respond as those 
who were receiving emails and possibly verbal reminders from their incubator 
staff members with whom they were already familiar and may have felt more 
inclined to help. Of the 72 respondents reporting an incubator zip code, 19 were 
contacted directly and 53 by incubator staff. This yields a 61% response rate for 
those contacted directly compared to a 23% rate for those contacted by a liaison. 
 
Recommendations for Application 
 Based on the findings of this study, there are farm incubator participants 
that would be willing to borrow through a Peer Group Lending Program. 
However, the results are not as ubiquitous as anticipated and further research is 
needed to determine if such a financing strategy could be used on a reasonable 
scale. If a microfinance institution or incubator is interested in utilizing a PGLP 
strategy, they should start by marketing to those individuals who are already 
willing to borrow from other sources such as commercial banks, credit unions, 
and friends and relatives. Additionally, those who are heavily reliant on their 
fellow incubator farmers and mentors but not necessarily involved with wider 
farming networks may be prime targets. More context-specific research, perhaps 
at the regional, local, or incubator scale should be conducted to determine the 
extent to which PGLPs can be utilized, if at all, within a particular locale. 
Interviews and other means typical of market analyses are recommended.  
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 Even if not a plea for a PGLP strategy, the recognized need for financing 
mechanisms geared towards, and readily accessible by, beginning farmers is 
invaluable. Additionally, the ability for incubators to partner with other institutions 
and organizations to offer subsidized land and equipment or arrangements for 
the lease or sharing of such resources should likely be a major focus of 
incubators in all regions. The fact that so many incubator farmers feel they are 
strapped for time to devote to becoming profitable farmers may be indicative of 
the fast pace of our society in general. Just as probable is the likelihood that 
many beginning farmers are required to split their time between farming and 
another occupation. Again, perhaps this is a cry for upfront capital investment in 
such ventures, a role that incubators can help facilitate. 
 
Conclusions and Further Research  
 If social cohesion and need for financing were the strong predictors they 
were expected to be among farm incubatees, this would be a likely population for 
whom PGLPs would work. Social capital did appear to exist rather abundantly 
and need for access to financial capital was certainly recognized as a challenge, 
yet the results were not overwhelming. As far as the implications this has for the 
broader population of farmers, those involved in local food systems, and other 
socially engaged groups, it is difficult to say. It appears that possibly smaller 
niche groups such as those incubatees relying on other farmers only within their 
incubators may need to be identified and targeted for PGLP participation. 
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Additionally, the need to establish more sound measures of social capital that 
account for contextual differences was highlighted. The unique responses to the 
“similar background” measure of social capital from this survey reveal an area to 
examine among farm incubator participants as well as other groups targeted for 
PGLPs.  Again, one can see the need for research focused on a specified target 
population to fully comprehend their financial needs and social preferences. This 
will likely require research methods such as interviews and case studies that 




Appendix A: Farm Incubators in Study 
Table A-1: Final List of Study Incubators and Respective Locations 
  Organization Name City State 
1 Adelante Mujeres  Forest Grove OR 
2 
Community CROPS (Combining Resources, 
Opportunities and People for Sustainability) Lincoln NE 
3 Community Farm of Simsbury Inc. Simsbury CT 
4 
Cultivate Kansas City and Catholic Charities of Northeast 
Kansas Kansas City KS 
5 Duluth Community Farm (Growing Farms) Duluth MN 
6 Elma C Lomax Farm Incubator Concord NC 
7 Farley Center Farm Incubator  Verona WI 
8 Growing Agripreneurs Central Point OR 
9 Horn Farm Center York PA 
10 Huerto de la Familia Eugene OR 
11 Lowcountry Local First: Dirt Works North Charleston SC 
12 Maverick Farms (FIG) Valle Crucis NC 
13 
Oregon State University Extension Service and 
Multnomah County Portland OR 
14 Rogue Farm Corps Ashland  OR 
15 Seattle Tilth: Farm Works Seattle WA 
16 Sustainable Urban Agriculture Initiative Charleston WV 
17 The Groundswell Center for Local Food & Farming Ithaca NY 
18 The Intervale Center Burlington VT 
19 The Seed Farm Emmaus PA 
20 Tilian Farm Development Center Ann Arbor MI 
21 Viva Farms Mount Vernon WA 
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Appendix B: Fisher’s Exact Tests P-Values 
Table B-1: P-Values for All Fisher Exact Tests 
*Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level. 
  
Independent Variables Dependent Variables   
  PGLPLiab PGLP)Total Direction 
Social Capital Composite .115 .501 NA 
Social Capital w/o Background .476 .160 NA 
Affirmative Background Response .246 .187 NA 
Reliance Within Incubator .437 .102 Positive 
Reliance Outside of Incubator .584 .732 NA 
Strong Incubator Reliance Only .035* .043* Positive 
Organizational Membership .251 .560 NA 
Rank of Access to Capital Challenge .864 .658 NA 
Incubator Access to Financial Assistance 
Used 
.283 .299 NA 
Incubator Small Bu iness Planning Used .445 .051 Positive 
Credit Card Use .228  .455 NA 
Loan Use .235 .619 NA 
Commercial Loan Willing? .008** .129 Positive 
Incubator Loan Willing? .000** .015* Positive 
Credit Union Loan Willing? .004** .082 Positive 
Friend/Relative Loan Willing? .017* .046* Positive 
Savings Willing? .647 .234 NA 
Credit Card Use Willing? .209 .213 NA 
Gov't Loan Willing? .003** .420 Positive 
Composite Willingness to Borrow 
(commercial, credit union, friend, 
incubator, government) .075* .124 Positive 
Travel Time .419 .408   
Farmer Opp. Cost .795 .356 NA 
Mentor Opp. Cost .276 .290 NA 
# of Meetings/Month .224 .741 NA 
Attendance Required? .245 .451 NA 
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Figure C-1: Age 
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Figure C-3: Race 
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Figure C-9: Services Offered by Incubators and Used by Participants 
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Figure C-12: Organizational Involvement 
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Figure C-13: Travel Time to Incubator 
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Figure C-14: Incubator Meetings per Month 
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Opportunity Cost Approximations 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three statements? 
 I feel that required meetings/events with other farmers are worth my time. 
 I feel that required meetings/events with current or potential customers are worth 
my time. 
 I feel that required meetings/events with mentors, staff, and trainers are worth my 
time. 
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Appendix D: Survey Flow Chart  
Figure D-1: Survey Question Flow Diagram
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Appendix E: Survey 




This survey has been created to gain insights about farm incubators, farmers 
associated with those incubators, and how these farmers can better be served 
financially. It is divided into several sections relating to you, your incubator or 
training program, challenges you face, and opportunities available to you. 
 
The survey is intended for farmers who meet the following four criteria: 
 
 1. Must be a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (with a valid “green 
 card”) 
 2. Must be at least 18 years old 
 3. Must have lived in the United States for at least 1 year 
 4. Must currently be receiving services or have recently received services 
 from a farm incubator (The term "incubator" will be used throughout this 
 survey to mean the apprenticeship or farm training program with which 
 you are associated  and from which you were selected to participate in 
 this study.) 
 
Your answers to this survey are crucial for generating a broader base of 
knowledge about successful farm incubation and the means by which farmers in 
incubators are receiving services and acquire or seek to acquire financing. Your 
responses are extremely important for guiding practitioners and researchers in 
evaluating and creating methods by which to provide services and capital access 
to farmers like you. 
 
Should you decide to participate in this research, your responses to this survey 
will be completely anonymous. The survey author will never under any 
circumstances report individual responses to questions in such a way as to 
identify a particular respondent. 
 
Thank you very much for your time and interest in helping us by completing this 
survey. 
  
                                                 
1
The survey presented here represents all the questions from the English version asked in present tense. See 
Appendix D for a better understanding of skip logic used.  
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This first section will ask questions to ensure you are eligible to complete 
this survey. 
 
1. Into which age category do you fall? (Please select one.) 
o Under 18 years 
o 18 to 25 years 
o 26 to 35 years 
o 36 to 45 years 
o 46 to 55 years 
o 56 to 65 years 
o 66 to 75 years 
o 76 to 85 years 
o 86 years and over 
 
2. Are you a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident who has lived in the 




 3. Have you recently received or are you currently receiving services from 
 a farm incubator or other farm training program, and are you willing to take 
 this survey?  (Please select one.) 
o Yes I am currently receiving services from a farm incubator and am 
willing to take this survey. 
o Yes I have recently (in the past 5 years) received services from a 
farm incubator and am willing to take this survey. 
o No, I have not recently received nor am I currently receiving 
services from a farm incubator. 




This section will ask general questions about the incubator with which you 
are affiliated and your association with that incubator. 
 
4. How many other farmers currently participate in your farm incubator? 
(Please select one.) 
o 0 to 5 
o 6 to 10 
o 11 to 20 
o 21 to 30 
o 31 to 50 
o 51 to 100 
o More than 100 
o Not sure 
 
 5. How long have you been a member of your farm incubator? (Please 
 select  one.) 
o Less than 3 months 
o 3 to 6 months 
o 7 months to less than 1 year 
o 1 to 2 years 
o More than 2 years 
 
 6. Please select whether or not each of the following services is provided 
 by your incubator. (Please select one option per row.)2 
 
 Yes No Not sure 
Training o  o  o  
Financial/small business planning o  o  o  
Access to financial assistance (ex. Loans, grants, 
etc.) 
o  o  o  
Networking events o  o  o  
Marketing o  o  o  
Packaging o  o  o  
Distribution o  o  o  
Equipment o  o  o  
Land for lease o  o  o  
Land for sale o  o  o  
 
Other service(s) offered (please specify)_______________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
2
 All questions utilizing charts were spaced evenly in the online version of the survey but were adapted to 





 7. Of the services your incubator provides, which one(s) have you 








Training o  o  o  
Financial/small business planning o  o  o  
Access to financial assistance (ex. Loans, grants, 
etc.) 
o  o  o  
Networking events o  o  o  
Marketing o  o  o  
Packaging o  o  o  
Distribution o  o  o  
Equipment o  o  o  
Land for lease o  o  o  
Land for sale o  o  o  
 
Other service(s) you have used (please specify)_________________________ 
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This section asks questions to address relationships among farmers both 
associated with and not associated with your incubator. 
 
 8. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other farmers 
 associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or guidance? 
 (Please select one.) 
o 0 times 
o 1 to 2 times 
o 3 to 4 times 
o More than 4 times 
o Not sure 
 
 9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following four 











Most other farmers 
associated with my 
incubator face the 
same challenges I 
do. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I share similar 
values with most 
other farmers 
associated with my 
incubator. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Most other farmers 
associated with my 
incubator come 
from a similar 
background as me. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I feel that I can 
easily relate to 
most other farmers 
associated with my 
incubator. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 10. Apart from the incubator, are you involved in any local level 
 organizations, groups, associations, or programs that relate to farming 
 (such as a Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) group, mutual water 
 district, producer association, Farm to School program, etc.)? (Please 





 11. Which organization(s) related to farming are you most engaged with? 
 (Please list up to three.) 
  1.__________________________________________ 
  2.__________________________________________ 
  3.__________________________________________ 
 
 12. On average, how many times per month do you rely on other local 
 farmers not associated with your incubator for assistance, support, or 
 guidance? (Please  select one.) 
o 0 times 
o 1 to 2 times 
o 3 to 4 times 
o More than 4 times 




This section asks questions regarding the travel costs you face in being an 
incubator farmer. 
 
 13. On average, how much time does it take you to travel one way from 
 home to your incubator? (Please select one.) 
o Less than 5 minutes 
o 5 to 10 minutes 
o 11 to 20 minutes 
o 21 to 30 minutes 
o 31 minutes to 1 hour 
o More than 1 hour 
 
 14. On average, how many times a month do you meet with others 
 (farmers, mentors, staff, etc.) from your incubator? (Please select one.) 
o 0 times 
o 1 to 2 times 
o 3 to 4 times 
o 5 to 6 times 
o 7 to 8 times 
o More than 8 times 
 
 15. Are you required by your incubator to attend meetings/events away 
 from the incubator (such as farmers markets, training classes, etc.)? 
 (Please select one.) 
o Yes 
o No 




This section asks questions about the perceived costs of participating in 
an incubator. 
  
 16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following three 






















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  









o  o  o  o  o  o  o  













This section will ask about your farming expectations after incubator 
participation. 
 
 17. Do you expect to produce goods for sale to others after you complete 
 your incubator experience? 
o Yes 
o No 




This section addresses challenges you perceive in becoming a profitable 
farmer. 
 
 18. Please rank the top four challenges you currently face in becoming a 












o  o  o  o  
Land costs o  o  o  o  
Time o  o  o  o  
Farming 
knowledge 
o  o  o  o  
Labor costs o  o  o  o  
Labor availability o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  
Access to capital o  o  o  o  
Equipment costs o  o  o  o  
Water scarcity o  o  o  o  
Competition o  o  o  o  
Regulations o  o  o  o  
 




This section asks questions about how you acquire or seek to acquire 
financial resources for your farming business. 
 19. Not including credit card use, have you taken out any loans to secure 
 resources for your farming business in the past year? (Please select one.) 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not sure 
 
 20. Considering these loan(s) you received over the past year for your 
 farming business (from banks, credit unions, family members, etc.), in 
 what range would you estimate the total amount falls? Please do not 
 include credit card usage. (Please select one.) 
o Less than $5,000 
o $5,000 to $9,999 
o $10,000 to $19,999 
o $20,000 to $29,999 
o $30,000 to $35,000 
o More than $35,000 
 
 21. Have you used a credit card to secure resources for your farming 
 business in the past year? (Please select one.) 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not sure 
 
 22. Approximately how much have you charged to your card(s) in the past 
 year? Please only consider charges for acquiring resources for your 
 farming business. (Please select one.) 
o Less than $1,000 
o $1,000 to $2,499 
o $2,500 to $4,999 
o $5,000 to $10,000 















 23. Currently, how likely or unlikely are you to use the following resources 















Credit card o  o  o  o  o  o  
Credit union 
loan 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Commercial 
bank loan 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Loan from a 
friend or relative 
o  o  o  o  o  o  






o  o  o  o  o  o  
 




This section asks questions about possible participation in a microfinance 
peer group lending program.  
 





Microfinance: providing very small loans, referred to as microloans, (typically 
$35,000 or less) to individuals for the purpose of creating or expanding 
businesses. 
 
Peer Group Lending Program (PGLP): a microfinance mechanism in which 
clients form groups with several other people of their choice. The group members 
are then responsible for monitoring and approving each other’s loans in regularly 
held meetings. Members are also held accountable for repayment of each other’s 
loans, thus encouraging selection of group members that are willing and likely 
able to repay their loans. If all the members of the group are meeting their 
repayment obligations, the loan process continues. Otherwise, no member of the 
group is eligible for future loans. This mechanism spreads risk among clients and 
lenders, thus reducing the cost of making microloans for lending institutions and 
allowing for lower interest rates than would typically be available from 
commercial lenders. 
 
 24. Thinking of several colleagues whom you trust, would you be willing to 
 form a peer group and participate in a PGLP as defined above, in which 
 you would all be responsible for repayment of each other's loans, thus 
 reducing the interest rates available to you? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not Sure 
 
 25. Would you be more willing to participate in a PGLP if shared liability 
 for each other's loans was not enforced, thus slightly reducing interest 
 rates available to you, but not as much as in the previous scenario of a 
 traditional PGLP? 
o Very much more willing 
o Somewhat more willing 
o Slightly more willing 
o Not at all more willing 




 26. What is the primary reason you would consider participating in a 
 PGLP? (Please select one.) 
o Group networking and support 
o Ease of loan approval 
o No need for collateral 
o Low interest rates 
  Other (please specify) ___________________________ 
 
 27. What is the primary reason you would consider participating in a 
 PGLP? (Please select one.) 
o Group networking and support 
o Ease of loan approval 
o No need for collateral 
o Low interest rates 
o Shared risk 




This final section will ask some basic demographic questions for 
comparison to the larger farming population. 
 




 29. In what country were you born? 
  Country:  ____________________________________ 
 
 30. What is your racial background? (Please select all that apply.) 
o White 
o Black or African American 
o Asian 
o Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Other 
 
 31. Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent? (Please select one.) 
o Yes, Hispanic or Latino 
o No, not Hispanic or Latino 
 
 32. In what ZIP code is your primary residence located? (Please enter 5-
 digit ZIP code.) 
  ZIP Code: ________________ 
 
 33. In what ZIP code is the main training site of your incubator located? 
 (Please enter 5-digit ZIP code.) 







Unfortunately, you are not eligible to complete this questionnaire. Thank you for 






Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. 
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